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ABSTRACT 
 
AID IN THE CONTEXT OF FRAGILE STATES: THE CASE OF SOMALIA 
 
By 
 
 
Hana Hersi 
 
 
 
 From 1980 to 2013, Somalia received more than $14 billion in foreign aid and yet 
managed to get listed among the most fragile states in the world. With Somalia’s 
government lack of capabilities and expertise in handling such huge aid flows, issues of 
accountability arise, as well as concerns of whether foreign aid has by any measures 
contributed to improving the state's peace, stability, and governance. 
Statistical analysis was conducted using quantitative, secondary data obtained from the 
World Bank to observe the relationship between foreign aid, governance, and institutions 
in Somalia. Time series data of official aid to Somalia and governance indicators such as 
political instability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, rule of law and 
control of corruption from the periods 1996 to 2013 was examined. 
 The results show that there is a statistically significant negative relationship between 
foreign aid (development and humanitarian aid) and governance indicators (political 
stability, rule of law and government effectiveness). In addition, there is no statistically 
significant evidence that there is a relationship between foreign and control of corruption 
indicator. By separately testing the relationship between development aid and governance 
indicators, the results show that there is a statistically significant negative relationship 
between development aid and governance indicators (political stability, rule of law and 
government effectiveness). Moreover, there is no statistically significant evidence that 
there is a relationship between development aid and control of corruption indicator. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The debate of foreign aid to fragile state is a never ending one, with some 
questioning its effectiveness while others boasting about its effect in reducing poverty 
and contribution to economic growth. Burnside and Dollar (1997, 2000) found that aid 
might be most effective in countries that possess sound policies that promote economic 
growth while Collier and Dollar (2001, 2002) put an emphasis on the selectivity of aid in 
which donor countries should take into consideration the recipient government’s existing 
policies and institutional capabilities when allocating aid to maximize the effectiveness. 
In Somalia’s case, however, to ensure aid effectiveness, unconventional methods 
must be developed. As a fragile state, Somalia’s institutions are generally weak and 
unable to formulate the development policies necessary to promote economic growth 
(OECD, 2008). In addition, the international community constantly faces the predicament 
of finding suitable measures of allocating aid more effectively. Hence, allocation of 
foreign aid to fragile states requires closer attention as conventional ways seems to fail, 
raising the need for developing new measures that specifically target the fragile states 
context.  
 
Statement of the Problem 
From 1980 to 2013, Somalia received more than $14 billion in foreign aid and yet 
managed to get listed among the most fragile states in the world. With the civil war in 
Somalia lasting for more than two decades, numerous lives and properties were lost, 
thousands of Somalis displaced, and large numbers of refugee camps started to increase 
in neighboring countries. The international community has taken it upon its shoulders to 
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provide humanitarian assistance to those affected by the civil war and has continued to 
provide aid until this present time. Alongside humanitarian aid, development aid was also 
provided for the rebuilding process of the shattered government institutions as well as 
rehabilitation of the infrastructure affected by the war. The aftermath of the war, however, 
left Somalia's government unable to perform its duties of providing public services and 
expanding its authority within and outside its borders, thus leading the UN to fill that 
vacuum by assigning African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) forces to take on 
that responsibility.  
With Somalia’s government lack of capabilities and expertise in handling such huge 
aid flows, issues of accountability arise, as well as concerns of whether foreign aid has by 
any measures contributed to improving the state's peace, stability, and governance. 
One might ask, why does the international community continue to pour aid into what is 
considered to be a bottomless sinkhole where foreign aid is not being properly handled, 
improvement in governance is not being recorded, and yet positive results are expected?  
 
Purpose of the Study 
The overall purpose of this study is to review and examine the effect of foreign aid in 
Somalia in improving governance, strengthening institutions as well as curtailing the 
political, economic and social issues that Somalia has been facing for the last 20 years. 
 
Research Questions and Hypothesis 
The main questions that this paper is trying to answer are as follows:  
1. Has foreign aid promoted improved governance in Somalia or hindered it? 
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2. How can aid be provided to Somalia to strengthen state stability and governance? 
The hypotheses proposed in this study are: 
1. Foreign Aid to Somalia has not contributed to the improvement of the state’s political 
stability.  
2. Substantial amount of foreign aid delivered over a long period of time has had a 
significant negative effect on Somalia's governance and institutions.  
  
Structure of the Study 
After reviewing scholarly views concerning issues of fragile states and foreign aid as 
a whole and Somalia's case in-depth, statistical data from the World Bank will be 
analyzed in order to determine whether foreign aid to Somalia has significantly 
contributed to improved governance and strengthened institutions. Finally, the study will 
compile research findings and make further recommendations on suitable mechanisms of 
extending foreign aid effectively to fragile states, particularly Somalia. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The main purpose of this chapter is to review and compare different theories and 
concepts regarding the subject of fragile states and aid delivered to fragile states. This 
chapter will attempt to define what fragile states are all about; identify different types of 
foreign aid and contrast opinions regarding the effectiveness of aid to fragile states. 
 
Foreign Aid 
Lancaster (2007) defines foreign aid as a “voluntary transfer of public resources, 
from a government to another independent government, to a non-governmental 
organization, or to an international organization with at least a 25 percent grant element, 
one goal of which is to better the human condition in the country receiving the aid”. 
According to Lancaster, the main purpose of aid is either “diplomatic, developmental, 
humanitarian relief or commercial”. On the other hand, the Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) defines the type of aid they provide, known as Official Development Assistance 
(ODA), to consist of “flows to developing countries and multilateral institutions which 
are undertaken by the official sector” (OECD, 2006). These flows are mainly for 
development purposes by which a developed donor country provides financial assistance 
to a developing country in the form of grants or loans. 
Different types of aid depend on the context that it is being provided for. Aid might 
be bilateral, where a certain government extends financial assistance to another 
government, or multilateral, where financial assistance is extended by major international 
development organizations such as World Bank, IMF or regional development banks to 
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governments of developing countries. The intention and the conditions of such financial 
assistance might vary between urgent humanitarian aid to development aid. Moreover, the 
conditions of offering such assistance might range between low-interest loans, gifts or 
grants (OECD, 2006).  
According to DAC, foreign aid can be classified into two major categories, 
humanitarian and development aid. Humanitarian aid is mostly provided by international 
aid organizations in times of sudden or recurring disasters. Aid provided in such 
situations might include supplementing vital assistance such as food, clean water, shelter, 
and medical services or in the form of offering protection of human lives. Aid agencies 
that operate under these situations are responsible for providing immediate relief to the 
affected as well as ensuring their safety. Moreover, humanitarian aid is considered to be 
in the form of a grant and is not subject to repayment. Development aid, on the other 
hand, is a form of aid provided by the national government of OECD member countries 
to developing and least developing countries in an attempt to alleviate poverty and 
promote economic development. Development aid can be in the form of grants or loans 
with low-interest rates. Moreover, development aid can be both bilateral and multilateral 
in the sense that an OECD member’s government provides financial assistance to another 
non OECD member government or indirectly extends financial assistance through 
international development organizations. 
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Fragile States  
There is no universally agreed definition of the term fragile states. Some international 
development organizations (e.g. OECD) define fragile states as a state’s failure to 
perform its fundamental duties of providing basic public services to its people and to 
sustain peace, security, and justice within and along its territories. According to OECD 
(2008), fragile states are defined to be states “unable to meet [their] population’s 
expectations or manage changes in expectations and capacity through the political 
process”. In addition, USAID (2005) narrows down its definition of fragile states by 
emphasizing effectiveness and legitimacy in fragile states from political, security, 
economic and social aspects1.  
The Department of International Development (DFID) defines fragile states as “those 
where the government cannot or will not deliver core functions to the majority of its 
people, including the poor” (DFID, 2005). Moreover, the Center for Research on 
Inequality and Social Exclusion (CRISE) defines fragile states as “failing, or at risk of 
failing with respect to authority, comprehensive service entitlement to legitimacy” 
(CRISE, 2009). In other words, it appears that diminishing state legitimacy is the major 
indicator of defining state fragility. Such states have failed to deliver basic public services 
to its citizens, establish mutual trust with civil society, and maintain sound and strong 
institutions. 
Furthermore, some researchers oppose the notion of states’ political “will” that major 
international development organizations place great emphasis and suggest to focus more 
                                               
1 Means of measuring effectiveness and legitimacy are solely based on quantitative methods such as 
interviews, polls and survey’s in which issues of reliability often arise.  
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on states’ institutions rather than political “will”. According to Engberg-perdersen, 
Andersen and Stepputat (2008), state fragility is “institutional instability undermining the 
predictability, transparency and accountability of the public decision-making process and 
the provision of security and social services to the population” (Engberg-pedersen et al., 
2008). In addition, Stewart and Brown (2009) identify fragile states as states that have 
failed or on verge of failing in terms of: i) authority failure; ii) service failure; and iii) 
legitimacy failure. The combination of these failures is said to be an indicator 
determining the degree of state failure that a country might face.  
Different international development organizations have their own measures in which 
they develop certain categories to assess the degree of state fragility (either fragile or 
failed) and its nature. These categories are often met with criticism as they mainly focus 
on contextualizing different types of states into limited categories. Planning interventions 
by using those categories might not be helpful as they fail to capture different degrees of 
state fragility. However, these categories serve as a guide to better understand the context 
of fragility within a state. According to OECD (2012), fragile states are classified into 
four categories:  
States Fragility Indication 
Post conflict A state coming out of conflict situation 
Deteriorating governance 
environment 
A state facing risk of weakened governance 
Gradual improvement A state in the process of recuperating and improving governance 
prolonged crisis A state where the degree of fragility is alarming thus paving the 
way for complete state failure. 
Source: OECD (2012), Managing Risks in Fragile and Transitional Contexts 
 
Meanwhile, DFID (2005) categorizes fragile states into four different environments: i) 
“good performers” where states possess strong capabilities and political will; ii) “weak 
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but willing” where a governments’ lack of capacity hinders its ability to implement 
relevant policies; iii) “strong but unresponsive” where states are capable of somewhat 
meeting desired development agendas and; iv) “weak-weak” where the state lacks the 
desired political will and capacity. 
To wrap up, previous studies have failed to produce a unanimous definition of fragile 
states, with some stressing on a state’s failure to deliver basic public services while others 
emphasize on the lack of political legitimacy and different degrees of state failure in 
which fragile states might embroil in. It is to be noted that once these definitions are 
linked together, a broad definition capturing different aspects of fragile states can be 
developed. 
 
Aid Effectiveness to Fragile States  
Literature on aid effectiveness in fragile states is far from abundant compared to the 
ample literature on aid effectiveness for all foreign aid recipients.  
McGillvary (2006) discusses issues related to aid allocation to fragile states and 
criticizes donor’s failure to coordinate and harmonize aid, where some fragile states end 
up receiving less aid. He also points out the need for donors to develop certain 
mechanisms in which aid will be allocated more effectively in fragile states.  
On the other hand, Kasseri and Though (2014) demonstrate in their empirical 
findings that “foreign aid has an influence on development in fragile states”, citing the 
importance of state and donor programming priorities and policy instruments used to 
improve aid effectiveness in fragile states. In addition, the authors state that foreign aid is 
considered to be more effective in fragile states when it is in the form of “budget support”, 
 9 
especially investing in infrastructure and strengthening government capacity to deliver 
public services. 
Gupta et al. (2005), claims that joint efforts of fragile states and donors are essential 
in utilizing aid more effectively once states create a stable macroeconomic environment 
and sound financial institutions that are capable of determining the amount and duration 
required to spend aid while donors assist those states in strengthening their financial 
institutions. In addition, Browne (2007) claims that aid to fragile states based on donor’s 
political agendas, where aid is provided at the “wrong time” and with “ wrong attitudes”, 
tends to eventually hinder the process of development in fragile states. Such approaches 
by some donors took their toll on fragile states where aid has failed to serve its ultimate 
purpose. Furthermore, Browne suggests that donors need to display strong commitment 
and eliminate barriers to development in order to make aid more effective. 
The Department for International Development (DFID) states that, in order for aid to 
be effective in fragile states, certain prerequisites must take place, for example, 
conducting a prior analysis of the political situation, assessing the cause of state fragility, 
and developing early warning and response mechanism to combat instability. Also, the 
report highlights the significance of providing aid in reinforcing state’s capacity and 
institutions to the extent of “good enough governance” where a fragile state would be at 
least capable of delivering basic public services to its citizens (DFID, 2005). 
Meanwhile, OECD (2007) refers to the importance of principles for good 
international engagement in fragile states and situations in facing recurring challenges of 
aid effectiveness in fragile states. The principles emphasize adopting comprehensive 
approaches to aid while taking political commitment in fragile states into consideration. 
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The principle notes the significance of a prior analysis of the political situation in a 
fragile state, then developing appropriate aid allocation mechanisms that are devoted to 
ensuring peace and stability in fragile states. 
In recent years, much criticism and accusation have been channeled towards donors 
for failing to adopt successful and applicable principles that specifically target fragile 
states. Some emphasize on the importance of strengthening a state’s capacity and the role 
of development partners in deciding and maintaining a harmonized and holistic approach 
for aid to be effective. Others contend that development agenda’s for fragile states are 
over-shadowed by security priorities and the war on terror rather than addressing essential 
social and economic issues.  
Lately, discussions regarding the improvement of aid effectiveness have been taking 
place with some suggesting to embrace a holistic approach for aid to be effective by 
simultaneously addressing social, economic and security priorities and adopt mechanisms 
that enhance donor’s accountability towards recipient fragile states. On the other hand, 
others place emphasis on developing strategies that permit states to effectively participate 
and exercise a sense of ownership for better development outcomes. 
Based on the above literature, it is difficult to deny the fact that foreign aid is 
indispensable to fragile states, yet, theories differ in which means and measures can aid 
be most effective in fragile states. Harmonization and coordination of aid efforts by the 
donor community are considered to be essential in fragile states while setting priorities 
for development programs and policy instruments that are necessary to make aid more 
effective are taken into consideration. Also, it is recommended that foreign aid would be 
most effective when donors and fragile states take the initiative of working together to 
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create a suitable macroeconomic environment and to support financial institutions. Last 
but not least, the need for donor’s strong commitment and distancing politics from aid is 
highly regarded in the case of fragile states. Developing a generalized template for all 
foreign aid recipients might be unsuitable for fragile states as they require special 
attention, in which approaches to aid delivery should be designed to the country context.  
 
Aid Effectiveness in Somalia  
A review of the literature indicates that it is debatable whether foreign aid has been 
successful in Somalia. Being a recipient of foreign aid for more than two decades, 
Somalia’s government has clearly failed to demonstrate full commitment to tackling 
issues of security, governance, transparency, and accountability. It is an undeniable fact 
that foreign aid has been helpful in battling the effects of recurring droughts and famine 
in Somalia, but it is also to be noted that serious incidents of mishandling foreign aid 
funds have been frequently reported in recent years.  
Menkhaus (1997), describes foreign aid to Somalia of being “notoriously 
unsuccessful”, by recalling the “massive armed humanitarian intervention” that took 
place in Somalia in 1992 to 1995, that resulted in the emergence of a corrupt and 
“repressive state”. He also collectively blames UN agencies, bilateral donors, NGOs and 
local leaders for their respective roles of delaying the response to Somalia’s famine due to 
their inflexible red tape measures, failing to align foreign aid with the needs and priorities 
of the country, fueling conflicts and associating with local militias and diverting foreign 
aid for personal benefits. These above-mentioned actors, according to Menkhuse, are 
collectively responsible for aid ineffectiveness in Somalia. 
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According to International Crisis Group (2011), foreign aid to Somalia has been 
widely misused by government officials, thus accusing the former Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG) for failing to manage foreign aid more effectively. In addition, a 
World Bank report disclosed that large amounts of foreign aid received by the 
Transitional Government “have not been accounted for” indicating the possibility of 
corruption being among the probable causes. Joakim Gundel in 2009 reported that the 
Somali government understated the amount of revenue it collected claiming that they 
only generated $11 million while auditors estimated expected revenue to mount up to $94 
million (VoA, 2012). This implies that management of public funds in Somalia is less 
transparent and needs to be urgently addressed. 
Furthermore, it is stated that the consecutive Somali governments in the periods of 
2000-2011 received bilateral aid amounting to $308 million, mostly donated by Arab 
Countries. Approximately “two-thirds” of that aid has been reported to have disappeared 
(The East African, 2012). Such an incident led the UK Foreign Minister, William Hague, 
to declare that “an international board to oversee the distribution of aid funds needed to 
be established urgently” (BBC, 2012). The success of this international initiative might be 
the solution for Somalia’s weak transparency issues. 
Menkhaus (2014) describes Somalia as a “graveyard of foreign aid” where the 
international community has (for more than 20 years) dedicated enormous amounts of 
funds for the purpose of institution-building in Somalia, yet the country is still considered 
to be one of the most fragile states in the world. Menkhaus demonstrates that “the inverse 
relationship between level of aid and institutional building in Somali-inhabited areas of 
the Horn gives reason for a pause”, taking into account, the most fragile region of the 
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horn, the capital city Mogadishu, which has been receiving large amount of foreign aid 
compared to its northern counterparts (e.g., Somaliland and Puntland), has exhibited 
serious signs of discrepancy between amount of foreign aid received and expected 
outcome. This shows that large amounts of foreign aid accompanied with spoilers and 
corruption effects in Somalia can “inadvertently fuel the very impulse to 
de-institutionalize the state that the aid is setting out to fix” (Menkhause, 2014). 
Hammond and Lee (2012) examine the obstacles that humanitarian action is faced 
with in Somalia by emphasizing “humanitarian space” and the role that politics plays in 
such space. The authors stress that politicization of aid had an adverse effect on the 
mutual trust that existed between stakeholders, citizens, and aid personnel serving in 
conflict regions thus further narrowing the humanitarian space in Somalia. Nevertheless, 
humanitarian aid has been noted to be mostly provided in non-conflict zones in Somalia 
where access to such zones and reaching out to vulnerable citizens is considered to be 
possible compared to war-affected zones that suffer from problems of famine, internal 
displacement, and recurring droughts, making it more difficult and dangerous for aid 
personnel to extend humanitarian assistance. 
To sum up, the literature on aid to Somalia is limited. Nevertheless, the existing 
literature acknowledges that foreign aid to Somalia has slightly contributed to the 
institutional building in certain parts of Somalia and assisted vulnerable citizens, mostly 
in non-conflict areas. However, foreign aid in Somalia tends to contribute to the 
deterioration of institutions and the emergence of issues of lack of accountability and 
transparency, which can only be battled with the establishment of an independent entity 
mandated to manage the distribution of aid funds more effectively. 
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III. SOMALIA AS A FRAGILE STATE 
Historical Background 
The end of the 21st century witnessed an outbreak of a barbarous civil war in 
Somalia. The war was a result of the uprising of armed rebel groups against President 
Siad Barre’s regime during the late 1980s. In 1991, the clan-based armed groups 
succeeded in overthrowing the regime, leading to continued power struggle, especially in 
the south, between armed rivalries which lasted for decades.  
One of the main outcomes of the civil war was the creation of separate governance 
parts within Somalia where political divisions based on 'clan-ism’ took place. On May 18, 
1991, the Somali National Movement (SNM) held a grand conference in the city of Buroa 
where the northern clans announced Somaliland’s secession from the unity with Somalia, 
declaring the independent Republic of Somaliland. The declaration shielded people from 
the continuing war and famine in the south, making them focus on the state rebuilding 
process. Today, the autonomous state of Somaliland possess the prerequisites of a 
sovereign state, with a democratically elected government capable of maintaining 
security and providing public services within and along its borders, imposing taxes, 
issuing its own currency and passport as well as formulating political, economic and 
social policies. Such an achievement is attributed to the collective efforts of the citizens 
of Somaliland and the diaspora community which assisted in laying the foundations of a 
government of a national unity without the assistance of the international community. 
Though Somaliland efforts of sustaining peace and development have been 
acknowledged by the international community, Somaliland is deprived of international 
recognition as a sovereign state and lacks international legal status for the past 24 years.  
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Unlike Somaliland, the Puntland State of Somalia is a non-secessionist state that 
doesn’t pursue independence from Somalia and complies with the federal system of 
government. The Puntland State of Somalia is a self-governing unit in northeastern 
Somalia, established in 1998 after the continuous discontent of the northeastern clans 
with the lack of progress of the national government in the south. 
According to a recent OECD report on fragile states, Somalia is considered to be one 
of the most fragile states in the world, ranking the lowest in terms of governance 
indicators such as voice and accountability, political stability and absences of violence, 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. In 
2011, Somalia as a whole received more than $1 billion in foreign aid amid the severe 
famine that affected the lives and properties of more than one million people (World 
Bank, 2015). For decades, Somalia continued to receive generous amounts of foreign aid. 
Nonetheless, significant progress toward strengthening governance, maintaining the 
state's peace and stability, or promoting economic development has not been made. 
In the 1990s, numerous attempts were made by the international community to assist 
Somalia in establishing a functional legitimate state. One of these attempts was initiated 
by the United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM). Unfortunately, their attempt at 
bringing together the conflicting factions to determine and lay the foundations of a 
government of national unity has failed. The Nairobi peace talks in 2004 resulted in the 
establishment of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) which was shortly 
immersed in constant internal conflicts and splits, thus paving the way for the emergence 
of the infamous Islamic Court Union (ICU), a group of Sharia-based courts that formed a 
rivaling parallel administration to that of the TFG. The ICU became more powerful than 
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the TFG. 
With the patronage of some African nations, political dialogues between the ICU and 
TFG to share power took place in Khartoum, Sudan, which eventually, after several 
rounds, resulted in the election of the Commander in Chief of ICU, Sheikh Sharif, to 
become the President of Somalia’s TFG. In 2012, the TFG mandate came to an end, 
paving the way for the start of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and the election 
or perhaps the “selection “of a new president took place. After several rounds of voting, 
legislators elected current President Hassan Sheikh, to become the first President of 
Federal Government of Somalia, thus ending decades of political vacuum in Somalia. 
Even with the formation of a somewhat “legitimate” Somali government, the OECD 
continues to list Somalia as a fragile state, mainly due to its poor scores of governance 
indicators and extreme vulnerability to shocks and violence. 
With reference to the OECD typology described above (page 7), Somalia’s state of 
fragility can be categorized as a prolonged crisis in which the degree of fragility is 
alarming, paving the way for a complete state failure. 
 
History of Aid to Somalia 
After the end of the British and Italian colonial rule in the north and south of Somalia, 
the Democratic Republic of Somalia was formed on July 1, 1960, with the unification of 
the former British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland. With an estimated population of 3 
million in the 1960’s, Somalia’s income per capita was about $50. (International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, 1969) 
Somalia, one of the poorest countries in the world, also happens to be one of the 
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major recipients of foreign aid. In the periods between the 1970s and 1980s, Somalia’s 
ODA per capita was estimated to be around $15. (ibid.) 
 
Table 1-1 | Total Official Development Assistance to Somalia (1980-1990) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The World Bank Group, Net Official Development Assistance and Official Aid Received (current US$). 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ALLD.CD 
 
 
Table 1-1 illustrates official aid received by Somalia in the periods between 1980 and 
1990. One can easily identify that official aid has decreased in the first half of 1980s and 
bounced back in the later half. 
 
It is important to note that foreign aid to Somalia has been fragmented in terms of 
quantity and magnitude. According to the German Planning and Economic Group in 
Somalia (1969), by the end of the 1960s, Somalia had received S.Sh1.62 million in 
development aid which is estimated to be 85% of the total aid in the government budget. 
In addition, the largest donor in the periods between 1963 and 1969 was the U.S.S.R, 
donating almost 20% of the total development aid received by Somalia. (German 
Planning and Economic Advisory Group, 1969) 
Aid to Somalia is described to have possessed several forms. First, countries that 
enjoyed close ties with Somalia have provided development aid in the forms of grants. An 
exceptional case is the aid given by China, which can be described as tied aid. Chinese 
Year ODA 
1980 479,960,000 
1981 382,380,000 
1982 473,880,000 
1983 341,030,000 
1984 347,590,000 
1985 350,710,000 
1986 506,500,000 
1987 587,070,000 
1988 431,720,000 
1989 419,150,000 
1990 514,810,000 
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donors demanded certain prerequisites in exchange to implementing development 
projects such as reconstruction and rehabilitation of vital infrastructures, i.e., Hargeisa 
city’s water supply. Second, under multilateral aid programs, technical assistance was 
extensively provided to support government institutions and training of public officials. 
Third, concessional loans with favorable low-interest rates were provided by the World 
Bank and USAID. Fourth, Russia’s assistance to Somalia was partially in the form of 
short-term to mid-term commercial loans with low-interest rates. Finally, humanitarian 
assistance, mostly food aid, was provided by the United States through World Food 
Program (O. Mehmet, 1971). 
Development aid delivered by international agencies to Somalia ranged between 
grants, loans, and technical assistance. It is worth mentioning that in the 1960s, 
multilateral development aid in Somalia by the European Economic Community (ECC) 
aimed to financially support Somalia’s government institution, while aid provided by the 
UN, UNESCO, WHO and FAO was in the form of technical assistance; aimed at 
conducting surveys and research with less emphasis on development schemes.  
Bilateral aid consisting of both grants and loans was generously provided to Somalia 
by donors like the U.S.S.R and U.S.A. The U.S, through USAID, provided aid to Somalia 
in the form of grants while the U.S.S.R offered commercial loans with preferential 
interest rates. Moreover, German assistance to Somalia was mainly in the form of 
long-term concessional loans with the interest rate of 2.5%. German aid included 
implementation of industrial projects, construction of roads, and the establishment of a 
technical institute in the Northern part of Somalia. The Italian assistance to Somalia 
varied between grants dedicated to physical infrastructure and mid-term commercial 
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loans carrying an interest of 7.5% (O. Mehmet, 1971).  
Hence, the periods between 1960 and 1970 witnessed the emergence of several ‘aid 
players’ with different motives and interest taking part in Somalia’s development process 
by offering a substantial amount of aid in the forms of grants, loans, and technical 
assistance. However, in the wake of the civil war that began in 1991, drastic changes to 
the ‘aid players’ took place with some being forced to withdraw from the scene, and the 
strong emergence of new and old donors, namely Arab Countries and the U.S.  
In 1991, Somalia was engulfed in a gruesome civil war that exhausted and displaced 
thousands of lives and tore the country into regions, where resources were looted and 
widespread chaos took place. As a consequence, Somalia suffered from a severe 
man-made famine in 1992 due to the constant violence over power that ravished the 
country, thus requiring the assistance of the international community in overcoming the 
aftermath of the famine. Responding to the humanitarian crisis in Somalia, the United 
States emerged as one of the major donors of humanitarian aid and embarked on a 
military mission to restore political stability which unfortunately ended with death of 18 
U.S soldiers and hundreds of Somalis, (the infamous “Black-hawk Down” incident), thus 
leading to its withdrawal from Somalia in 1994. 
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Table 1-2 | Total Official Aid to Somalia (1991-2000) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The World Bank Group, Net Official Development Assistance and Official Aid Received (current US$). 
 
 
 
Table 1-2 shows the changing pattern of official aid to Somalia during the beginning 
of the civil war in 1991. Although official aid has increased from the pre-civil war period, 
the year 1993 witnessed a sudden increase in official aid. The increase is attributed to the 
widespread famine caused by the escalating violence in country. 
 
According to the World Bank, from 1991 to 2013, total net ODA to Somalia was 
estimated to be almost $9.5 billion (World Bank, 2015). Foreign aid to Somalia was 
aimed to bring to an end the power vacuum that resulted from the constant fighting 
between rivaling factions, to strengthen ailing government institutions, and to restore 
peace and stability (U.S Department of State, 2015). Much of the international 
community efforts were dedicated to stabilizing the political situation in Somalia by 
supporting and initiating peace talks between rival political factions. It is also to be noted 
that much of the aid devoted to those talks has substantially contributed to the 
establishment of the Transitional Federal Government which, in the end, transformed into 
the Federal Government of Somalia (AMISOM, 2015) 
Year ODA 
1991 186,420,000 
1992 653,660,000 
1993 892,120,000 
1994 535,120,000 
1995 187,930,000 
1996 88,180,000 
1997 81,180,000 
1998 81,320,000 
1999 115,700,000 
2000 102,230,000 
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However, Somalia experienced yet another famine in 2011, which according to 
World Food Program (WFP), affected the lives of almost 4 million people (WFP, 2011). 
Once again, the international community rushed to the rescue by donating over $1 billion 
in humanitarian and development aid. With the establishment of the new Federal 
Government of Somalia in 2012, ODA to Somalia doubled from $497 million in 2010 to 
more than $990 million in 2013. Such increase in aid can be attributed to the donors’ 
attempt to stabilize and ease political hostility, to improve governance, and to strengthen 
Somalia’s frail institutions. 
Table 1-3 | Total Official Aid to Somalia (2004-2013) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The World Bank Group, Net Official Development Assistance and Official Aid Received (current US$). 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ALLD.CD 
 
 
Table 1-3 presents official aid to Somalia in the periods of 2004 and 2013. With the 
establishment of the transitional government of Somalia in 2004, official aid increased 
substantially and reached its peak in 2011, after the UN declaration of famine in Somalia. 
Official aid kept on increasing after the 2012 elections of a new government. 
Year ODA 
2004 201,280,000 
2005 240,220,000 
2006 396,170,000 
2007 393,740,000 
2008 765,870,000 
2009 661,640,000 
2010 497,500,000 
2011 1,095,640,000  
2012 998,620,000 
2013 991,920,000 
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Breakdown of ODA to Somalia (1980 - 2013) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: OECD Statistics (data only) 
 
In the 1980s, Somalia had a full functioning government and most of foreign aid received 
by the government was in the form of development aid, almost 90%. Things started to 
change in the end of 1990’s where foreign aid given to Somalia has shifted from being 
mainly development aid. The increase in the percentage of humanitarian aid is attributed 
to the long lasting civil war in Somalia that started in 1991, which caused a vacuum in 
power for more than two decades and hence recurring droughts and famine. 
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IV. DATA ANALYSIS  
Methodology of Research 
The methodology used in this paper is both qualitative and quantitative. Data on 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) and Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) of 
Somalia were both obtained from the World Bank Group.  
In 1996, the World Bank Group developed a set of indicators to measure and rank 
individual and aggregate governance indicators across countries. The following six 
indicators measure multiple dimensions of governance. 
Governance Indicator Measurement 
Voice and Accountability Extent of perceived freedom of expression and association of civil 
society. 
Political Stability and 
Absence of Violence 
Level of states security and political situations. 
Regulatory Quality Government ability to develop and implement policies that 
promote private and public sector development. 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Government performance of provision of public services. 
 
Rule of Law Ability to enforce rules, regulations and access to justice. 
Control of Corruption Governments effort to enhance transparency measures and 
management of public funds 
Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators, World Bank 
 
The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) are designed datasets collected 
through survey methods, which compiled the views of a large number of respondents 
(citizens, business groups, and experts) in developed and developing countries on 
governance related issues. 
The approximate measurement scale for governance indicators ranges from (-2.5 and 
+2.5). However, there are cases of anomalies, e.g. Somalia, where political stability and 
absence of violence indicator surpassed the -2.5 scale (-3.32), indicating the level of 
dissatisfaction of Somali respondents with their country’s political situation. 
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The Worldwide Governance indicators are published annually, except for the years 1997, 
1999 and 2001, where the World Bank Group did not collect nor published governance 
data. 
 
Table 1-5| Official Development Assistance and Governance Indicators in Somalia 
(1996- 2013) 
 
Year  Official Aid (million $)  
 Political 
Stability  
Index  
 Control of 
Corruption 
Index  
 Rule of 
Law Index  
 Government 
Effectiveness 
Index  
1996  88   -2.65   -1.74   -2.22   -2.10  
1998  81   -2.30   -1.78   -2.31   -2.16  
2000  102   -2.08   -1.78   -2.31   -2.28  
2002  153   -2.53   -1.17   -1.91   -1.60  
2003  176   -2.67   -1.80   -2.11   -2.10  
2004  201   -2.93   -1.78   -2.32   -2.09  
2005  240   -2.75   -1.68   -2.21   -2.17  
2006  396   -2.78   -1.84   -2.55   -2.31  
2007  394   -3.24   -1.90   -2.62   -2.34  
2008  766   -3.31   -1.92   -2.67   -2.45  
2009  662   -3.32   -1.72   -2.50   -2.26  
2010  498   -3.11   -1.74   -2.45   -2.24  
2011  1,100   -3.07   -1.70   -2.36   -2.16  
2012  999   -2.85   -1.59   -2.45   -2.23  
2013  992   -2.75   -1.58   -2.44   -2.27  
Source: The World Bank Group, Net Official Development Assistance and Official Aid Received (current US$). 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ALLD.CD. The World Bank Group, Worldwide Governance Indicators. 
 
  Table 1-5 shows the corresponding amount of aid received and governance indicators 
of Somalia from 1996 to 2013. Within the span of 15 years, Somalia received almost $7 
billion in humanitarian and development aid, however, governance indicators seem to 
decline with the increase of aid. 
 
Limitations of Data 
Perhaps the major limitations of this section are the lack of sufficient time-series data 
on governance indicators (not available before 1996) and the non-availability of 
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governance data for specific years (1997, 1999 and 2001). Despite these limitations, an 
attempt to find the relationship between foreign aid on Somalia’s governance indicators 
was undertaken.  
 
Figure 1-1| Official Aid in Somalia and Political Stability Index (1996-2013) 
 
 
Source: The World Bank Group, Net Official Development Assistance and Official Aid Received (current US$). 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ALLD.CD. The World Bank Group, World Wide Governance Indicators. 
 
Figure 1-1 presents the official aid flow and political stability index from 1996 to 
2013. Clearly, the political stability index did not improve in Somalia as official aid flow 
increased throughout the years. Political stability index reached a record time low in the 
periods between 2007 and 2010 with the emergence of the Islamist group, Al-Shabaab, 
and their escalating terrorist activities in the following years. 
 
Figure 1-2| Official Aid in Somalia and Rule of Law Index (1996-2013) 
 
Source: The World Bank Group, Net Official Development Assistance and Official Aid Received (current US$). 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ALLD.CD. The World Bank Group, Worldwide Governance Indicators. 
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Figure 1-2 shows changing patterns of official aid flow to Somalia and rule of law 
index. It is obvious that there is no or little variance in the rule of law index mainly due 
continuous violence and political tensions in the capital city, Mogadishu, which had 
spread to the other southern regions. Also, the Somali government’s inability to improve 
access to justice and draft and enforce laws and regulations contributed to the 
deterioration of the rule of law index. In a nutshell, the rule of law index continues to 
decline as official aid increases. 
 
Figure 1-3| Official Aid in Somalia and Government Effectiveness Index (1996-2013) 
 
 
Source: The World Bank Group, Net Official Development Assistance and Official Aid Received (current US$). 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ALLD.CD. The World Bank Group, Worldwide Governance Indicators. 
 
 
Figure 1-3 illustrates annual changes in official aid in Somalia and government 
effectiveness index. Somalia’s weak consecutive governments were not able to provide 
and extend basic public services within and outside the capital city of Mogadishu. With 
the continuing armed violence, the Somali government lacked the means to deliver its 
core function, public services. As shown above, there is no significant variance in the 
index as the aid to Somalia increases. 
 28 
Figure 1-4 | Official Aid in Somalia and Control of Corruption Index (1996-2013) 
 
 
Source: The World Bank Group, Net Official Development Assistance and Official Aid Received (current US$). 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ALLD.CD. The World Bank Group, Worldwide Governance Indicators. 
 
 
Figure 1-4 presents the variance in official aid to Somalia and control of corruption 
index. Since 2007, Somalia ranked as the most corrupted country in the world, according 
to Transparency International, an international organization that conducts annual surveys 
to measure corruption indices around the world. It is not a surprise that even with the end 
of the transitional period and holding “democratic” elections, the consecutive Somali 
governments remained corrupt. This implies that annual increase in official aid to 
Somalia has significantly affected control of corruption index by making it much worse. 
 
Figure 1-5| Total Official Development Assistance by Expenditure Type (2008-2012) 
 
 
Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC CRS data 
?
?
?
?
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Figure 1-5 shows total official development assistance to Somalia, by expenditure 
type in the years 2008 to 2012. Total ODA for Somalia in the years 2008 to 2012 was 
estimated to be around $ 3.7 billion and the share of humanitarian aid of ODA was 
estimated to be approximately $ 2.5 billion (66%), while the share of governance, peace 
and security was estimated to be 5 times smaller than expenditure of humanitarian aid, 
$ 500,000 (13%). This shows that the donor community places greater emphasis on 
expenditure on humanitarian aid and overlook the importance of strengthening 
governance, peace and security in Somalia. 
 
Research Characteristics 
An attempt to perform a statistical analysis was made using STATA (Statistics/Data 
Analysis) package. Statistical analysis was conducted using quantitative, secondary data 
obtained from the World Bank to observe the relationship between foreign aid, 
governance, and institutions in Somalia. 
Time series data of official aid to Somalia and governance indicators such as political 
instability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, and rule of law and control 
of corruption from the periods 1996 to 2013 was examined. The significance interval set 
for this study is 95% (p-value < 0.05).  
The results of the statistical tests can be found in the in the appendix. 
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Research Findings 
To recall the hypothesis made in the beginning of this paper, the assumption made 
was: foreign aid to Somalia has not contributed to the improvement of the state’s political 
stability, and a substantial amount of foreign aid delivered over a long period of time has 
had a significant negative effect on Somalia's governance and institutions.   
Using STATA, the results show that there is a statistically significant negative 
relationship between foreign aid (ODA) and governance indicators (political stability, 
rule of law and government effectiveness). In addition, there is no statistically significant 
evidence that there is a relationship between ODA and control of corruption indicator. 
By separately testing the relationship between development aid and governance 
indicators, the results show that there is a statistically significant negative relationship 
between development aid and governance indicators (political stability, rule of law and 
government effectiveness). Moreover, there is no statistically significant evidence that 
there is a relationship between development aid and control of corruption indicator. 
Clearly, foreign aid did not lead to improved governance in Somalia. There has not 
been any significant change in governance indicators from 1996 to 2013, but we cannot 
rule out that foreign aid may have prevented governance indicators from getting worse, or 
had no effect at all. 
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Somalia, a fragile state, consumed by a vicious civil war that lasted for more than 
two decades, has been a major recipient of foreign aid. However, Somalia’s government 
continues to face issues of political legitimacy, weak governance, and widespread 
corruption. Since 1980, Somalia has received more than $14 billion in foreign aid, yet 
signs of improved governance have not been shown. 
There are several factors that might have contributed to Somalia’s unimproved 
governance. First, in extreme cases of humanitarian emergencies which Somalia had its 
own share of (extreme droughts and famine in 1992 and 2011), donors continue to 
provide aid in spite of serious governance issues. Second, before Somalia’s “democratic” 
elections in 2012, there was a serious power vacuum that the consecutive transitional 
governments could not fill. This led to difficulties of using foreign aid to address 
governance issues. Third, referring to Somalia’s foreign aid data, official development 
assistance to Somalia is mostly dedicated to humanitarian aid (emergency response, 
reconstruction, and rehabilitation) where governance and development share are 
significantly low. This implies that humanitarian aid is not a good instrument for 
addressing governance issues in Somalia.  
Finally, the issue of foreign aid to fragile states, specifically Somalia, is quite 
complex. Further research is needed as Somalia’s governance data in this study is limited 
or unavailable due to its state of extreme fragility. Moreover, as mentioned before, 
Somalia is divided into three parts: autonomous Somaliland, Puntland, and the 
government based South Somalia. Closely studying the impact of foreign aid on 
governance in these separate parts is needed to determine whether foreign aid has 
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contributed to improved governance since the secessionist and autonomous state of 
Somaliland and non-secessionist Puntland enjoy relative peace and political stability 
compared to the government based South Somalia. 
Based on these research findings and with reference to the review of literature, the 
following recommendations might be considered to ensure that aid to Somalia 
strengthens state stability and governance. 
1. Donors should separate politically-motivated aid from development-motivated aid. 
2. There has to be some kind of conditionality measures to aid given to Somalia to ensure 
the government commitment to initiate reforms. 
3. Somalia’s transparency and accountability issues have to be carefully addressed to 
make sure that aid doesn't end up in the wrong ‘pockets’.   
4. Aid to Somalia should be provided with clear targets and aimed at measurable results. 
The donors and the Somali government should be held more accountable for achieving 
specified goals. 
5. Donors must consider providing sufficient development aid for Somalia to address its 
governance issues as humanitarian aid fails to improve it.  
6. And last, but not least, communication between the donors and the Somali government 
should be greatly strengthened to ensure that aid fulfills its purpose of alleviating poverty, 
initiating development progress, and strengthening state stability and governance. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics (Foreign aid and governance indicators) 
 
          PS          18   -2.739639    .3801629     -3.324     -2.082
          GE          18   -2.169444     .182127      -2.45       -1.6
          RL          18   -2.339722    .1913303      -2.67      -1.91
          CC          18   -1.708472    .1737671     -1.924     -1.167
        LNFA          18    19.41278    .9302737      18.21      20.81
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
 
 
Descriptive Statistics (Development aid and governance indicators) 
 
          PS          18   -2.739639    .3801629     -3.324     -2.082
          GE          18   -2.169444     .182127      -2.45       -1.6
          RL          18   -2.339722    .1913303      -2.67      -1.91
          CC          18   -1.708472    .1737671     -1.924     -1.167
        LNDA          18    4.783971    .7597009   3.851424   6.268357
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
 
 
Variables Abbreviation 
Political Stability PS 
Control of Corruption CC 
Rule of Law RL 
Government Effectiveness GE 
Natural Log of Foreign Aid LNFA 
Natural Log of Development Aid LNDA 
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Correlation and Linear Regression of Foriegn Aid (ODA) and Governance Indicators 
(1996-2013) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PS = 3.276767 - 0.3099199 LNFA + E 
(R2= 0.5751) 
                                                                              
       _cons     3.276767   1.346194     2.43   0.027     .4229639     6.13057
        LNFA    -.3099199   .0699513    -4.43   0.000      -.45821   -.1616297
                                                                              
          PS        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =  .25542
                                                       R-squared     =  0.5751
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0004
                                                       F(  1,    16) =   19.63
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =      18
. reg PS LNFA, robust
 
 
 
 
 
         PS    -0.7584   0.2757   0.6248   0.3942   1.0000
          GE    -0.4292   0.8404   0.8955   1.0000
          RL    -0.6155   0.6825   1.0000
          CC    -0.0423   1.0000
        LNFA     1.0000
                                                           
                   LNFA       CC       RL       GE       PS
(obs=18)
. correlate LNFA CC RL GE PS
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CC = -1.554917 - 0.00791 LNFA + E 
(R2= 0.0018) 
 
                                                                              
       _cons    -1.554917   .7265822    -2.14   0.048    -3.095203   -.0146321
        LNFA      -.00791   .0366689    -0.22   0.832    -.0856446    .0698246
                                                                              
          CC        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =  .17895
                                                       R-squared     =  0.0018
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.8319
                                                       F(  1,    16) =    0.05
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =      18
. reg CC LNFA, robust
 
RL = 0.1176454 - 0.1265851 LNFA + E 
(R2= 0.3788) 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     .1176454   .6551841     0.18   0.860    -1.271283    1.506574
        LNFA    -.1265851   .0335442    -3.77   0.002    -.1976956   -.0554745
                                                                              
          RL        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =  .15544
                                                       R-squared     =  0.3788
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0017
                                                       F(  1,    16) =   14.24
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =      18
. reg RL LNFA, robust
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GE = -0.5383448 - 0.084022 LNFA + E 
(R2= 0.1842) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Correlation and Linear Regression of Development Aid and Governance Indicators 
(1996-2013) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          PS    -0.6277   0.2757   0.6248   0.3942   1.0000
          GE    -0.4208   0.8404   0.8955   1.0000
          RL    -0.5840   0.6825   1.0000
          CC     0.0157   1.0000
        LNDA     1.0000
                                                           
                   LNDA       CC       RL       GE       PS
(obs=18)
. correlate LNDA CC RL GE PS
                                                                              
       _cons    -.5383448   .7144199    -0.75   0.462    -2.052847    .9761577
        LNFA     -.084022   .0357593    -2.35   0.032    -.1598283   -.0082156
                                                                              
          GE        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =  .16956
                                                      R-squared     =  0.1842
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0320
                                                       F(  1,    16) =    5.52
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =      18
. reg GE LNFA, robust
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PS = -1.236953 - 0.3141084 LNDA + E 
(R2= 0.3940) 
 
                                                                              
       _cons    -1.236953   .4929909    -2.51   0.023    -2.282047   -.1918594
        LNDA    -.3141084   .1060306    -2.96   0.009    -.5388834   -.0893335
                                                                              
          PS        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =  .30505
                                                       R-squared     =  0.3940
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0092
                                                       F(  1,    16) =    8.78
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =      18
. reg PS LNDA, robust
 
 
CC = -1.725701 + 0.003613 LNDA + E 
(R2= 0.0002) 
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       _cons    -1.725701   .2502954    -6.89   0.000    -2.256303   -1.195098
        LNDA     .0036013    .047857     0.08   0.941     -.097851    .1050536
                                                                              
          CC        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =  .17909
                                                       R-squared     =  0.0002
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.9409
                                                       F(  1,    16) =    0.01
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =      18
. reg CC LNDA, robust
 
RL = -1.636136 - 0.1470716 LNDA + E 
(R2= 0.3410) 
 
                                                                              
       _cons    -1.636136   .2008612    -8.15   0.000    -2.061943   -1.210329
        LNDA    -.1470716   .0407541    -3.61   0.002    -.2334665   -.0606767
                                                                              
          RL        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =   .1601
                                                       R-squared     =  0.3410
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0024
                                                       F(  1,    16) =   13.02
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =      18
. reg RL LNDA, robust
 
GE = -1.686829 - 0.1008819 LNDA + E 
(R2= 0.1771) 
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       _cons    -1.686829   .2355693    -7.16   0.000    -2.186213   -1.187444
        LNDA    -.1008819   .0441729    -2.28   0.036    -.1945243   -.0072394
                                                                              
          GE        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =   .1703
                                                       R-squared     =  0.1771
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0364
                                                       F(  1,    16) =    5.22
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =      18
. reg GE LNDA, robust
 
